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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between agglomeration economies and productivity in 
the context of a developing country while taking into account the marked presence of an 
informal sector. Using data from Colombia, we investigate the effect of agglomeration 
economies on formal and informal productivity. We examine whether the informal sector 
achieves benefits from agglomeration economies as well as whether there are differences 
between the formal and informal sectors in terms of agglomeration returns. We find that 
agglomeration economies, measured by the density of local employment, have a significantly 
positive effect on productivity in the informal sector, while there is little effect in the formal 
sector. We estimate an elasticity of wages with respect to employment density of 
approximately 2% for the informal sector, which implies that informal workers in denser 
areas will earn approximately 11% more than those in less dense areas.  
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1. Introduction 
The pace and content of urbanization have crucial implications for developing economies. 
Among the key benefits of urbanization are gains from agglomeration. There are benefits to 
location externalities that arise from a dense network of production and market access links 
that increase productivity and decrease the unit costs for each firm in the network (Fujita et 
al., 1999). It can be posited, however, that the magnitude of agglomeration economies 
depends on the types of workers and industries as well as on the period and country analyzed. 
In this sense, it is important to understand whether agglomeration economies produce similar 
benefits for developing countries compared to those previously demonstrated for developed 
countries (see, for example, Ciccone and Hall (1996), Rosenthal and Strange (2008a), Melo 
et al. (2009), Melo and Graham (2009)). 
 
Despite the rapid and continuing pace of urbanization in developing countries, formalization 
seems to have stalled, or at least it does not appear to be increasing as quickly as might be 
expected given these countries growth rates. The formal sector in developing economies is 
only responsible for a certain share of urban employment and growth. The informal sector, 
on the other hand, plays a large role in such economies, which constitutes an important 
difference between developing and developed economies (Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
According to estimates by Jütting and De Laiglesia (2009), over 55% of non-agricultural 
employment in developing countries is neither regulated nor protected by the state (informal 
activities). With regard to the size of the informal economy as measured as a percentage of 
GDP, Schneider et al. (2010) show that the shadow economy in developing countries 
accounts for approximately 40% of GDP. This discernible presence of the informal sector 
can affect the extent (or quality) of agglomeration economies, and the effects of urbanization 
could be just as likely to be found in the outcomes for the informal sector as for the formal 
sector. 
 
Given the significant differences in the economic characteristics of the informal and formal 
sectors (productivity, profitability, and size), there are different perspectives regarding how 
the informal sector contributes to and benefits from agglomeration economies. For instance, 
Annez and Buckely (2009) argue that the informal sector is unproductive and increases the 
costs for the formal sector, thus crowding out agglomeration economies. In contrast, 
Overman and Venables (2005) and Moreno-Monroy (2012) state that the informal sector also 
contributes to and benefits from agglomeration economies via its interaction with the formal 
sector throughout different value chains, whereby the informal sector both obtains inputs 
from the formal sector and supplies it with intermediate or final goods and services. As noted 
by Duranton (2009), there are intense links between the formal and informal sectors, which 
suggests that agglomeration effects are generated within both sectors, with benefits that 
accrue to both. According to Overman and Venables (2005), the existence of an informal 
sector can affect the benefits of agglomeration economies in two ways. On the one hand, the 
presence of an informal sector can drive up urban costs and crowd out the formal sector, but, 
on the other hand, the informal sector also contributes to agglomeration economies. In this 
sense, the informal sector comprises small-scale producers that establish important networks 
that contribute to the formation of clusters. Furthermore, as in the formal sector, the informal 
sector can achieve benefits from the productivity effects associated with the concentration of 
activity and employment. 
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In this paper, we investigate the effect of agglomeration economies on formal and informal 
productivity, and we analyze whether the formal or informal sector achieves greater benefits 
from the diversity of activities and the spillovers associated with urbanization economies. 
For the analysis, we used worker data for Colombia from the 2008-2014 period. The 
empirical analysis is based on regressions of individual worker wage rates, as a measurement 
of labor productivity, on employment density, which in turn is a measure of urban 
agglomeration. We calculated the elasticity of wages with respect to density for the formal 
and informal sectors while controlling for several socioeconomic, socio-demographic and 
regional characteristics. These regressions comprise instrumental variable estimates to 
correct for the endogeneity attributable to the reverse causality between wages and 
agglomeration. 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide new evidence on urbanization and its effects on 
developing countries while more closely considering the reality in such countries where 
formal and informal activities co-exist. To date few studies have analyzed the agglomeration 
effects in developing countries while taking into account the presence of the informal sector. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review. 
The theoretical framework is described in Section 3. Section 4 defines the empirical model 
used. In Section 5, we present the data sources used in the analysis. Section 6 statistically 
documents the relationship between agglomeration and wages while taking into account the 
existence of the informal sector. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the results, and Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
In this section, we provide a brief outline of the prior empirical results on the presence of 
agglomeration economies in some developing countries. The related literature is scarce, and 
the extant studies generally find that agglomeration economies have a significant effect on 
productivity, that is much higher compared to estimates for developed countries.1 
 
Developing countries are characterized by certain structural conditions such as economic and 
political instability, high rates of unemployment and underemployment, shallow markets, 
and low levels of industrial and infrastructure development. These conditions can affect the 
magnitude and quality of the external economies associated with agglomeration economies. 
Several studies have found quantitative evidence of both localization and urban effects. 
Henderson (1986), in his seminal work analyzing the role of localization and urbanization 
economies in productivity in the metropolitan areas of Brazil, finds that localization 
                                                          
1 The two benchmark studies that use aggregate data for the US, Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Rosenthal and 
Strange (2008a) for the years 1988 and 2000, respectively, report values for the elasticity of productivity with 
respect to density of approximately 4%-5%. For French cities, Combes et al. (2008) and then Combes et al. 
(2010) use individual data to estimate the effect of density on wages as a measure of productivity. They find an 
elasticity of wages with respect to density of approximately 3%. Using individual data for Italy, the UK and the 
Netherlands, Mion and Naticchioni (2009), D’Costa and Overman (2014), and Groot et al. (2014) obtain values 
of 1%, 1.6% and 2.1%, respectively. The previous studies are focused on static agglomeration effects, but more 
recent research is moving toward a dynamic framework (Glaeser and Maré, 2001). One of the most complete 
studies on the dynamic impact of agglomeration economies is De la Roca and Puga (2017). The authors attempt 
to disentangle the static urban wage premium from a dynamic urban wage premium using data for Spain and 
find an estimated dynamic elasticity of 5.1%, which is more than double the static elasticity of 2.2%. 
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economies play an important role in this regard, while urbanization economies are present 
but only play a marginal role. The results show that if employment in any sector in any region 
were to double, productivity as measured by value-added would increase by 11%. Lee and 
Zang (1998) report a comparable result in their study of the manufacturing industry in South 
Korea. The authors find that doubling the employment in a given sector and region is 
associated with a 7.9% increase in value-added per worker as a measurement of productivity. 
For Indian cities, the studies by Mills and Becker (1986), Becker et al. (1992), and Shukla 
(1996) show that equally significant increases in productivity are generated by urbanization. 
 
Among the more recent studies, Da Mata et al. (2007) examine Brazilian cities and find that 
the urban elasticity, which measures urbanization economies as market potential, is 11%. 
Similarly, Combes et al. (2015), who study Chinese cities and instrument density using three 
variables: peripherality, the historical status of the city, and the distance to historical cities. 
They find that the elasticity of wages with respect to density is between 10% and 12%. For 
the case of India, Chauvin et al. (2014) evaluate the effect of density on individual annual 
earnings at the district level and find a large elasticity of approximately 9%-12%.  
 
In the Colombian context, Duranton (2016) provides a comprehensive analysis of 
agglomeration effects for cities in Colombia in the period 1996-2012. In the paper, several 
dimensions of agglomeration economies are considered in the context of a developing 
country. In particular, the author analyzes the aspects of agglomeration that are associated 
with the complementarity between education and density as well as agglomeration effects by 
different types of workers, such as younger and informal workers. Duranton (2016) estimates 
wage equations where the city population is the measure of agglomeration economies. To 
correct for the reverse causation problem between wages and the agglomeration variable, the 
author implements a 2SLS strategy and instruments the current city population with long lags 
of population from 1843, 1870 and 1938. The main results show that the elasticity of wages 
with respect to the city population is 5%, and the result is robust to a several econometric 
specifications. Other interesting results include the absence of complementarity between city 
size and education and higher returns to city size for younger workers. The author explains 
these opposing findings to what would be predicted by the existence of greater learning 
effects in large cities by higher returns to agglomeration in the informal sector, where the 
workers are younger and less educated. This positive effect of agglomeration on wages in the 
informal sector is novel in the literature, which the author explains as possibly being related 
to the fact that informal workers may sell their products locally, where their incomes are 
more directly tied to local housing and transportation costs.   
 
Three considerations must be taken into account in the results found by Duranton (2016) 
regarding the informal sector. First, the results may depend on the definition of informality 
used. Duranton (2016) defines informal workers as those workers who do not have a written 
labor contract. However, this definition overlaps with that of self-employed workers, who 
are not the target population of analysis. Second, having a written labor contract is positively 
correlated with wages and with city size, such that workers with a written labor contract may 
not be comparable across cities of different sizes. Third, the estimation of agglomeration 
effects that distinguishes between formal and informal workers is not corrected for 
endogeneity of the city population, such that the estimators are biased and inconsistent. Thus, 
the results should be treated with caution. In this study, we address these issues. First, we use 
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alternative definitions of informality and test the sensitivity of the results to these different 
definitions. Second, in order to compare informal workers across cities of different sizes, we 
include occupation and economic sector variables in the regressions to control for current 
skills. Finally, all of our results are based on estimations using 2SLS techniques. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
In this section, we present the theoretical model upon which we structure our empirical 
specification of wages to test the impact of agglomeration economies on local productivity 
as measured by nominal wages (Combes et al., 2008; Melo and Graham, 2009; Combes and 
Gobillon, 2015). 
 
The profit of a competitive representative firm located in area 𝑎 in year 𝑡 is: 
 
𝜋𝑎𝑡 = 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑌𝑎𝑡 − 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝐿𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐾𝑎𝑡                                        (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑎𝑡 is the output of the firm, which uses two inputs, labor 𝐿𝑎𝑡 and other production 
factors 𝐾𝑎𝑡, such as land, capital, or intermediate inputs. 𝑝𝑎𝑡 is the price of the good produced, 
𝑤𝑎𝑡 is the wage rate on the local labor market, and 𝑟𝑎𝑡 is the unit cost of non-labor inputs. 
 
Suppose that the production function of the firm is Cobb-Douglas and can be represented by 
the following equation: 
 
𝑌𝑎𝑡 = 𝐴𝑎𝑡(𝑠𝑎𝑡𝐿𝑎𝑡)𝛼𝐾𝑎𝑡1−𝛼                                           (2) 
 
where 0 < 𝛼 < 1 is a parameter, 𝑠𝑎𝑡 denotes the local labor skills, and 𝐴𝑎𝑡 is the local total 
factor productivity. In a competitive equilibrium, the first-order condition for the optimal use 
of labor is given by the following expression: 
 
 𝑤𝑎𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑡𝛼 (
𝐾𝑎𝑡
𝐿𝑎𝑡
)
1−𝛼
                                          (3) 
 
Using the first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to the other factors, 
reordering in terms of 𝐾𝑎𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑡⁄ , and inserting it into equation (3), we obtain: 
 
𝑤𝑎𝑡 = 𝛼(1 − 𝛼)
(1−𝛼 𝛼⁄ ) (𝑝𝑎𝑡
𝐴𝑎𝑡
𝑟𝑎𝑡
1−𝛼)
1 𝛼⁄
𝑠𝑎𝑡 = 𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑎𝑡                  (4) 
 
From this last expression, we note that the local average nominal wage depends positively 
on labor skills, 𝑠𝑎𝑡, the output price, 𝑝𝑎𝑡, and the technological efficiency of the local 
economy, 𝐴𝑎𝑡. We can also observe that the local level of wages is negatively determined by 
the costs of the other non-labor input factors, 𝑟𝑎𝑡. The effects of agglomeration and dispersion 
forces work through these three factors. The output and input prices, 𝑝𝑎𝑡 and 𝑟𝑎𝑡, capture a 
number of agglomeration mechanisms that operate through local markets, sometimes 
referred to as ‘pecuniary externalities’, while the local environmental efficiency, 𝐴𝑎𝑡, 
captures the effects from pure local externalities or ‘technological externalities’, that are not 
mediated by the market. 
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According to Combes and Gobillon (2015), there are two types of ‘technological 
externalities’. On the one hand, firms and consumers are grouped together in cities where 
they share indivisible goods such as airports, libraries, museums, universities, and hospitals. 
In this situation, all the local market participants benefit from the infrastructure via a 
reduction in access costs to such public goods, as the costs are spread across all the 
beneficiaries. This generates a first type of agglomeration economy, where the local total 
factor productivity, 𝐴𝑎𝑡, is larger in larger cites due to the presence of local public goods, 
thus increasing the composite labor productivity effect, 𝐵𝑎𝑡, and therefore the local wages. 
The second type of ‘technological externality’ emerges when the spatial concentration 
induces local knowledge spillovers that make firms more productive. This type of mechanism 
again makes 𝐴𝑎𝑡 large in large cities. 
 
The previous discussion attempted to explain how city size generates agglomeration 
economies. However, observation additionally tells us that city size generates not only 
agglomeration economies but also dispersion forces. Typically, excess concentration in large 
cities can imply negative externalities due to congestion, such as longer commuting costs and 
scarce land for housing and plants. Congestion in local public goods implies a reduction of 
𝐴𝑎𝑡, while scarce land can lead to costs of inputs that are not perfectly mobile, 𝑟𝑎𝑡, that are 
higher in large cities. These space constraints work as a dispersion force that has a negative 
effect on local wages (Tabuchi, 1998). 
 
Note that the composite labor productivity effect, 𝐵𝑎𝑡, is affected by both the pure 
externalities, 𝐴𝑎𝑡, and the effects related to goods or input prices, 𝑝𝑎𝑡and 𝑟𝑎𝑡. Thus, with this 
approach, we can estimate the overall effect of local characteristics but not the exact channel 
through which agglomeration economies work. In other words, we cannot identify price and 
technology effects separately; we can only estimate the combined net overall effect of all 
three mechanisms: (𝑝𝑎𝑡
𝐴𝑎𝑡
𝑟𝑎𝑡
1−𝛼)
1 𝛼⁄
. Furthermore, note that the correlation between wages and 
density only shows the overall impact of both agglomeration economies and dispersion 
effects. While the net effect of spatial concentration can be identified, it is not possible to 
identify these effects separately (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; 
Combes et al., 2008). 
 
4. Estimation strategy 
To apply equation (4) to the data, we formulate the following wage equation that expresses 
the theoretical model above as the empirical model to be estimated: 
 
ln  𝑤𝑖(𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 ln 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝜑 + 𝜋𝑜𝑖(𝑡) + 𝜎𝑒𝑖(𝑡) + 𝜃𝑎𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖(𝑡)    (5) 
 
where 𝑖 identifies the worker, 𝑜 refers to occupation, 𝑒 refers to the economic sector, 𝑎  
identifies the region, and 𝑡 specifies the time period. The “𝑖(𝑡)” subscripts indicate that the 
observations are an independent cross-sectional series where only N individuals are available 
in each period.  
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the nominal hourly wage. The economics 
literature agrees that considering nominal wages is a good measure of workers’ productivity, 
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and in the case of bargaining or in the presence of externalities, for instance, workers’ wages 
are likely to be higher in larger cities (Combes and Gobillon, 2015). Given that workers are 
mobile, the possible differences in real wages across cities should to some extent reflect 
differences in amenity value and not in productivity differentials across cities (Roback, 
1982). For instance, Albouy (2008 and 2009) for the US and more recently Albouy et al. 
(2013) for Canadian cities find that real wages are correlated with arts and climate cities, 
coastal proximity, sunshine, and mild seasons. Additionally, Duranton (2015) and De la Roca 
and Puga (2017) argue that wages should be measured in nominal instead of real terms 
because the former reflect differences in productivity across places, while the latter measure 
differences in quality of life levels. Glaeser (2008) offers more details on this point by using 
the spatial equilibrium approach. 
 
Our measure of urban agglomeration, ln 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦, is the logarithm of the municipality’s 
employment density, which is defined as the number of workers per square kilometer in each 
municipality using the average over the 2008-2014 period.2 The basic idea behind this 
variable is that high density is a potential source of increasing returns resulting from stronger 
knowledge and technological spillovers in areas of dense economic activity. 
 
As mentioned in the discussion of the theoretical framework, this measure of agglomeration 
economies can estimate various factors at the same time. First, this variable reflects the 
quality of urban life, which is expressed in higher urban rents. According to Roback (1982), 
the quality of urban life is positively correlated with higher wages in cities. Thus, the 
coefficient on employment density should be positive. Second, la variable can measure the 
level of negative amenities or disamenities in denser areas, including congestion, pollution, 
and noise. Disamenities would make working in a denser area unpleasant, which could be 
expected to be compensated by a higher wage (Borjas, 2008; Lee, 2016), causing the 
coefficient of employment density to be positive. Finally, a denser area can imply a plentiful 
labor supply that could decrease wages, which would make the coefficient negative. In this 
sense, Rosenthal and Strange (2008a) show that a negative sign could occur if there is a 
limited amount of job creation for a certain type of employment, which might mean that when 
there are more workers of a certain type, each worker would earn a lower wage. If the 
abovementioned three factors coincide, it would be difficult to determine the sign of the 
coefficient on employment density, indicating that the relationship should be tested 
empirically. 
 
It is important to note that we use the municipality as the spatial unit of analysis. Although it 
is not an ideal unit, it is the best available approximation of a self-contained labor market in 
Colombia. Municipalities are areas where a high proportion of people who live (work) in the 
area also work (live). As Dominicis et al. (2007) argue, if there is evidence of a concentration 
of residential activities, of work activities, and of social relationships that are created within 
                                                          
2 Following Combes and Gobillon (2015), we prefer to use employment rather than population because 
employment better reflects the magnitude of local economic activity. In addition, the results using population 
are generally very similar to those obtained with employment. The magnitudes of the coefficients on the 
logarithm of population density for an analogous estimation of Column 3 in Table 4 are as follows: for the total 
sample, 2.4% (statistically significant at the 5% level); for the formal sector, -0.5% (not statistically significant 
at the 5% level); and for the informal sector, 2.2% (statistically significant at the 5% level). To save space, full 
results using population variables are not presented here but are available upon request. 
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an area, then the area can be considered a self-contained labor market or a Local Labor 
System.3 According to the 2005 Colombian census, which is the most recent census available, 
89% of workers are employed in the municipality where they live, 8% work in a different 
municipality from where they live, 0.2% work in another country, and the remaining 2.8% 
do not know or did not answer.4 Another possibility is to use metropolitan areas as the spatial 
unit of analysis; however, as we will see, the results are very similar when we use 
metropolitan areas instead of municipalities (a similar conclusion is reached by Duranton 
(2016)) because for many cities but particularly the smallest, the municipality and the 
metropolitan areas coincide, whereas only the few largest, form large metropolitan areas that 
comprise several municipalities.  
 
The vector 𝑋𝑖(𝑡) contains the variables that measure a standard set of demographic attributes 
such as the worker’s level of education, gender, age and its square, and years in the current 
job and its square. In addition, in our model, we included sets of dummy variables to control 
for several sources of heterogeneity that can lead to omitted variable bias and inconsistency 
in the model parameter estimates. To capture macro-level changes in wage rates that are 
common to all individuals, we included time dummies, 𝛿𝑡. Similarly, to control for current 
skills, we added a set of occupation dummy variables, 𝜋𝑜𝑖(𝑡). We also included a set of 
dummy variables to control for economic sector heterogeneity and regional characteristics; 
these are represented by 𝜎𝑠𝑖(𝑡) and 𝜃𝑎𝑖(𝑡), respectively.  
 
To identify the agglomeration effects by job type, we split the sample into the formal sector 
and the informal sector, and we estimate equation (5) for each sector. We define informal 
workers as those workers who are not covered by health insurance and the pension system. 
Another aspect to be considered in the estimation is the endogeneity bias caused by the 
reverse causality between wages and agglomeration. Wages can increase due to higher 
employment density, but higher wages may also attract more people and firms to a given 
area. To avoid endogeneity bias, we implemented instrumental variable (IV) techniques. In 
the literature, long-lagged values of endogenous variables have been widely used as 
instruments since Ciccone and Hall’s (1996) pioneering work. The basic idea behind these 
instrumental variables is that deep time lags of urban density can to some extent explain the 
distribution of present densities, but they do not explain the distribution of current urban 
productivity levels. 
 
To construct our instruments for current density following Ciccone and Hall (1996), we use 
population data collected from the 1912, 1918 and 1928 censuses. Although national 
censuses had taken place in Colombia prior to these, we prefer to use censuses from the early 
1900s because most of the current municipalities were created at the end of the 1800s and 
the beginning of the 1900s. As such, we have complete information for the past populations 
of 390 municipalities. 
                                                          
3 As Openshaw and Taylor (1979) note, municipalities or metropolitan areas are much more related to the 
concept of local labor markets than the usual administrative areas, so they are a good option for overcoming the 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP). 
4 We calculated these percentages using information from the IPUMS-International database 
(https://international.ipums.org/international/) 
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We have to take into account that to yield unbiased estimates of the effect of density on wages 
using instrumental variables, our instruments must satisfy two conditions to be valid: 
relevance and exogeneity. While the first condition demands that our instruments be 
correlated with the contemporaneous employment density, the second requires that our 
instrument be uncorrelated with the error term 𝜀𝑖(𝑡). As mentioned by Combes and Gobillon 
(2015), it is possible to imagine a number of possible violations caused by alternative links 
between past populations and current wages, such as permanent local characteristics that may 
have affected past location choices and continue to affect local productivity today. Such 
characteristics include the centrality of the location in the country, a suitable climate, or 
geographic features such as access to the coast or the presence of a large river. To minimize 
these potential problems, we control for geographic characteristics in regressions and try to 
preclude such correlations. The details of the relevance and exogeneity tests for the 
instrumental variables are presented in Section 7. 
 
5. Data and variables 
Some studies of agglomeration economies use detailed spatial data on panels of workers or 
firms (see, for example, Combes et al., (2010) and Glaeser and Maré (2001)), which allows 
greater administrative scale analysis and the ability to control for unobserved individual 
characteristics that may be correlated with location choices. Unfortunately, these types of 
data are not available in Colombia or, generally, for most developing countries. Instead, we 
use a cross-sectional survey, the Colombian Great Integrated Household Survey (GEIH), 
which is carried out by the National Administrative Statistics Department (DANE). By using 
cross-sectional data, it is not possible to control for all the characteristics of individuals that 
shape their skills that do not change over time, the effect of which can be considered constant 
over time (Combes and Gobillon, 2015). However, there are various measures of observed 
skills that can be used at the cost of not controlling for unobservable individual 
characteristics. For instance, Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) and Wheaton and Lewis 
(2002) use measures such as diplomas or years of education. Another measure that has been 
used is the socio-professional category “occupation”, which captures the exact job carried 
out by workers and part of the effects of their past career. As such, occupation can be 
considered a measure that should be more highly correlated with current skills than 
education. Given that the GEIH gathers detailed information about populations’ general 
characteristics (gender, age, year of education, and municipality of residence) and their 
employment conditions (whether they work, what they do, how much they earn, number of 
hours worked and whether they have social security for health care), we included education 
and occupation as measures of workers’ current skills. These types of measures are often 
recorded in labor force surveys, and they allow greater comparability across developing 
countries.5 
 
We analyzed the period between 2008 and 2014. The databases for earlier years are not 
comparable because several methodological changes were made by DANE in 2007. After 
excluding individuals with no labor income, those who did not report their municipality of 
residence, and the 1% of workers with the lowest and highest wages each year, we had 
                                                          
5 Given the confidentiality of the data at the municipal level, all the estimations in this paper were conducted 
following DANE’s microdata-access policy, which implies working in situ under the supervision of DANE’s 
staff and with blinded access to sensitive information. 
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1,920,678 observations, with a mean of 270,000 observations per year, and information for 
568 municipalities.6 
 
We divide the workers into formal and informal workers. As noted above, informal workers 
are defined as individuals who do not have access to the social security system to receive 
healthcare and a retirement pension. Note that this definition has been widely used in prior 
research, including Perry et al. (2007), Jütting and De Laiglesia (2009), and García (2017), 
among many others. Following this definition of informality, we can observe in Table 1 that 
approximately 60% of the employees in Colombia are informal workers and that informal 
work is a persistent phenomenon. 
 
We also controlled for a standard set of demographic attributes in the models. These include 
the workers’ level of education, gender, age, years in the current job, occupation (10 
indicators), economic sector (8 indicators), and regional and geographic variables (five 
regional indicators: Central, Eastern, Western, Caribbean, and Orinoco7; and three 
geographic variables: water availability, soil erosion, and altitude and its square). We also 
included a measure of market access, namely, the distance in kilometers to the capital city of 
the department. In Tables 1 and 2, we show some descriptive statistics of these variables, 
which were calculated using person sampling weights from GEIH to ensure that the estimates 
are representative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Colombia covers an area of roughly 1,200,000 km2 and is divided into 32 administrative units called 
departments and a Capital District that is the country’s capital, Bogotá. Departments are country subdivisions 
similar to US states and are granted a certain amount of autonomy. Each department is composed of 
municipalities, among which there is a capital city of the department. In total, Colombia has 1,119 
municipalities (a more detailed characterization of Colombia can be found in Royuela and García (2015) and 
Nicodemo and García (2015)). 
7 Departments and municipalities are grouped into very broad regions according to their economic, demographic 
and social conditions as well as their location. These regions are composed of the following departments (capital 
city in parentheses): Central region: Bogotá, Antioquia (Medellín), Caldas (Manizales), Quindío (Armenia), 
Risaralda (Pereira), and Tolima (Ibagué); Eastern region: Boyacá (Tunja), Norte de Santander (Cúcuta), and 
Santander (Bucaramanga); Western region: Cauca (Popayán), Choco (Quibdó), Huila (Neiva), Nariño (Pasto), 
and Valle (Cali); Caribbean region: Atlántico (Barranquilla), Bolivar (Cartagena), Cesar (Valledupar), Córdoba 
(Montería), La Guajira (Riohacha), Magdalena (Santa Marta), Sucre (Sincelejo); Orinoco region: Caquetá 
(Florencia) and Meta (Villavicencio). A more detailed description of these regions can be found in Galvis 
(2001), Barón (2002), and García (2017).    
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     Table 1. Summary statistics at individual level  
 2008    2011    2014     All years  
     Mean   Std. Dev      Mean   Std. Dev      Mean   Std. Dev      Mean   Std. Dev  
Hourly wage $   1.52   2.04      1.96   2.38      1.83   2.01      1.76   2.16  
Male   0.57   0.49      0.56   0.50      0.55   0.50      0.56   0.50  
Age   37.99   12.81      38.31   13.18      38.54   13.43      38.29   13.15  
Years of education   9.53   4.56      8.93   5.26      9.96   4.52      9.56   4.65  
Education by levels:                                   
Primary school   0.26   0.44      0.26   0.44      0.23   0.42      0.25   0.43  
Middle school   0.19   0.39      0.16   0.37      0.18   0.38      0.18   0.38  
High school   0.33   0.47     0.36   0.48      0.34   0.47      0.34   0.47  
Technical or technological   0.08   0.27      0.08   0.27      0.14   0.34      0.10   0.30  
University   0.13   0.33      0.13   0.34      0.12   0.32      0.12   0.32  
Years in the current job   6.63   8.78      6.31   8.26      6.04   8.06      6.30   8.79  
Informality   0.63   0.48      0.63   0.48      0.58   0.49      0.61   0.48  
Region                                  
Central   0.51   0.50      0.51   0.50      0.53   0.50      0.52   0.50  
Eastern  0.11   0.31      0.11   0.31      0.11   0.31      0.11   0.31  
Western   0.17   0.38      0.17   0.37      0.17   0.37      0.17   0.37  
Caribbean   0.18   0.38      0.18   0.38      0.17   0.37      0.18   0.38  
Orinoco   0.03   0.16      0.02   0.16      0.03   0.16      0.02   0.16  
Occupation                                  
Professional   0.05   0.22      0.06   0.23      0.07   0.25      0.06   0.23  
Managers   0.11   0.31      0.11   0.31      0.10   0.30      0.11   0.31  
White collar   0.07   0.26      0.06   0.24      0.06   0.24      0.07   0.25  
Low white collar   0.09   0.28      0.09   0.28      0.09   0.29      0.09   0.28  
Sales employees   0.01   0.12      0.01   0.12      0.01   0.12      0.01   0.12  
Blue collar   0.20   0.40      0.19   0.39      0.18   0.38      0.19   0.39  
Low blue collar   0.06   0.24      0.07   0.25      0.07   0.26      0.07   0.25  
Skilled service workers   0.08   0.27      0.09   0.28      0.10   0.30      0.09   0.28  
Unskilled service workers   0.27   0.45      0.27   0.45      0.27   0.44      0.28   0.45  
Agricultural workers   0.04   0.20      0.04   0.20      0.04   0.19      0.04   0.20  
Sector                                  
Agriculture   0.05   0.22      0.05   0.22      0.04   0.20      0.05   0.22  
Industry   0.16   0.37      0.15   0.36      0.14   0.35      0.15   0.36  
Building   0.06   0.23      0.07   0.25      0.07   0.25      0.07   0.25  
Commerce and hotel   0.29   0.45      0.29   0.46      0.30   0.45      0.29   0.45  
Transport and tel   0.10   0.30      0.10   0.30      0.10   0.30      0.09   0.29  
Financial   0.09   0.29      0.10   0.29      0.10   0.31      0.10   0.30  
Adm. Pub   0.09   0.29      0.09   0.28      0.09   0.28      0.09   0.28  
Service   0.15   0.36      0.15   0.35      0.15   0.36      0.15   0.36  
Note: All data are weighted using person sampling weights from GEIH to be representative.  
 
  Table 2. Summary statistics at municipal level  
  Municipalities p25 Median p75 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Number of workers 568 5,200 8,879 13,905 26,574 156,488 341 3,399,830 
Municipal area (Km2)  568 161.3 358.6 842.2 765.9 1,529.6 15.4 17,641.70 
Density (workers per Km2) 568 10.6 25.5 57.0 94.8 326.3 0.176 4388.98 
Altitude (m.a.s.l.)  568 123.0 1,026.5 1,786.5 1,098.0 923.9 2 3,087 
Distance to the capital in Km 537  45.5   87.1   137.0   104.2   81.4  0 452 
Note: Number of workers using an average over the period 2008-2014. The distance to the capital city of the 
department in kilometers is calculated using Google Map. 
 
For all of the models, we used the logarithm of nominal hourly wages as the dependent 
variable. As mentioned above, our measure of urbanization is the logarithm of the 
employment density of each municipality. The municipalities have an average of 
approximately 26,000 workers, ranging from 341 workers to over three million. Figure 1 
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shows the employment density by municipality, and we can see that Bogotá, Medellín, Itagüí, 
Cali, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla, and Soledad have the highest levels of urbanization. Itagüí 
is the densest city in Colombia, with just over 4,500 workers per km2.8  
 
Figure 1. Employment density by municipality in Colombia 
 
           Note: Average employment density between 2008 and 2014. 
 
6. Documenting the agglomeration-wages relationship in the presence of an informal 
sector 
We begin with an illustration that stresses the topics included in this paper. Table 3 shows 
the average hourly wages earned by formal and informal employees for the three largest 
municipalities and for municipalities with low employment density, that is, with a density of 
between 70 and 100 workers per km2. We can observe that there is a clear relationship 
between wages and agglomeration. For formal employees, average wages are similar for the 
two groups of cities. In contrast, we can deduce from the data in the table that for all years, 
informal workers earned substantially higher wages in the larger cities. Taken as a whole, 
Table 3 suggests a positive relationship between agglomeration and wages for informal 
workers, but this relationship is weak for formal workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 These same cities also have the highest populations, and Itagüí is the most densely populated city in Colombia, 
with 12,114 people per km2 in 2014. 
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  Table 3. Average wages between formal and informal employees in select 
municipalities 
Sector Municipalities 
Hourly wages ($) 
2008 2011 2014 All Years 
Formal Bogotá, Medellín, Cali         2.13 2.75 2.47 2.45 
Less dense cities 2.02 2.94 2.48 2.58 
Informal Bogotá, Medellín, Cali         1.49 1.82 1.63 1.63 
Less dense cities 1.08 1.32 1.21 1.18 
Note: Less dense cities are those cities with an employment density between 70 and 100 workers per Km2. All 
data are weighted using person sampling weights from GEIH to be representative. All differences in means 
between groups of municipalities for the formal sector and the informal sector are significant at 1%. 
 
To confirm these relationships between agglomeration and wages by sector, we plotted the 
logarithm of wages against employment density for 568 municipalities for the formal sector 
and the informal sector separately. Figure 2(a) shows that for the total sample, the slope of 
the regression line between the logarithm of wages and the logarithm of density, which 
measures the density elasticity of wages, is 1%. Regarding the formal and informal sectors, 
Figures 2(b) and (c) show that while for the formal sector, the density elasticity of wages is 
-4.4%, for the informal sector, this elasticity is 1.3%. This result confirms our previous results 
of lower agglomeration returns for formal workers than for informal workers. 
 
These results are somewhat surprising because formal workers are more educated than 
informal workers and might have a greater ability to learn from nearby human capital. 
Furthermore, formal workers work in medium-large enterprises that can obtain greater 
benefits from labor market pooling and input sharing associated with agglomeration 
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2008b). On the other hand, informal workers are characterized by a 
limited education, and they tend to work in very small enterprises (Perry et al., 2007; Jütting 
and De Laiglesia, 2009; García, 2017; García and Badillo, 2017), which might imply that the 
workers are less able to absorb new knowledge, while the activities of small enterprises tend 
to be geared toward small local markets more than toward generating input-output linkages 
(Moreno-Monroy and García, 2016). 
 
According to Duranton (2016), this greater agglomeration effect in the informal sector may 
be due to workers in this sector obtaining higher benefits from the local market, and therefore, 
their incomes are more influenced by local housing and transportation costs. Another possible 
explanation could be that given that the creation of formal jobs in the economy is limited, 
having more formal workers might tend to result in each worker earning lower wages. This 
type of work-spreading would imply the opposite sign on employment density (Rosenthal 
and Strange, 2008a). The possibility that workers might concentrate in equilibrium in this 
manner, is consistent with the Harris-Todaro (1970) model, which shows that in a context of 
industrialization in a developing country, when the urban wage is fixed above the market-
clearing level, it can lead to unemployment in equilibrium, where unemployment goes 
undercover in the informal sector. 
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Figure 2. Employment density and wages in Colombia 
a) Total 
 
 
b)Formal 
 
 
C) Informal 
 
Note: The vertical axis represents log municipal hourly wages computed using 2008-2014 wage data after controlling for 
years effects, individual characteristics, occupation and economic sector. The horizontal axis represents log of average 
employment density between 2008 and 2014. There are 568 municipalities. All variables are centered around their mean. 
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7. Results 
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of the wage equation by 2SLS, which 
are reported in Table 4. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix report the results of the 
estimations by OLS for the total sample and after dividing the sample into formal and 
informal workers, respectively. To simplify the presentation, only the coefficients on the 
elasticity of wages with respect to density are provided. We begin by discussing the 
instrument diagnostic test reported at the bottom of the table. 
 
Regarding the exogeneity condition of the instruments, we used Hansen’s J test (1982) to test 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the long-lagged instruments. The results for instrument 
exogeneity for all models coincide with previous studies using similar instruments: the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity is not rejected at a 5 percent level of significance, suggesting that 
the instruments are exogenous. 
 
With regard to the relevance of the instruments, the first stage of the regression results 
indicates that the instruments for city density have considerable explanatory power. The 
explanatory power is tested using Shea’s (1997) partial R-squared, and we found values that 
range between 0.5 and 0.8 in our regressions. To further examine the relevance of the 
instruments, we carried out the Kleibergen-Paap test of under-identification, which tests 
whether the model is identified, where identification requires that the excluded instruments 
be correlated with the endogenous regressor. When the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
endogenous regressor, the matrix of reduced-form coefficients is not of full rank, and the 
model will be unidentified. Since we allow intra-group correlation, the relevant statistic in 
this case is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rank LM statistics. If we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the matrix of reduced-form coefficients is under-identified, it means that the 
instrument variable bias of the parameter estimates will be increased. The values presented 
in Table 4 for all models show that the tests reject the null hypothesis of under-identification 
at a 5 percent level of significance, implying that the instruments are relevant. 
 
Nonetheless, a rejection result for the null hypothesis in the Kleibergen-Paap test should be 
treated with caution because weak instrument problems may still be present. Weak 
identification arises when the instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor, but 
only weakly. As noted by Murray (2006) and Stock and Yogo (2005), when the instruments 
are poorly correlated with the endogenous regressors, the estimates from the instrumental 
variable model will be biased. In this case, and allowing intra-group correlation, the relevant 
test is the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank Wald F statistic, which involves testing the 
significance of the excluded instruments in the structural equation, resulting in the 
substitution of the reduced-form expression for the endogenous regressor in the main 
equation of the model (Baum et al., 2007; Davidson and MacKinnon, 2010). The critical 
values for this test are derived from Stock and Yogo (2005). The results reveal that the 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank Wald F statistic is higher than the Stock and Yogo (2005) 
critical values, suggesting that our instruments are not weak. 
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Table 4. Agglomeration effects and informality (2SLS) 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Only  emp. density 
Individual 
characteristics 
Sector- 
Occupation 
Geographic  
variables 
Market  
access Non-lineal 
Education 
effects 
 Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Log employment density -0.038*** 0.027*** 0.010 0.022** -0.004 0.021** -0.003 0.021** -0.005 0.020** 0.031 -0.082 -0.016 0.008 
 (0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0080) (0.0106) (0.0067) (0.0107) (0.0061) (0.0096) (0.0069) (0.0100) (0.0678) (0.1419) (0.0108) (0.0133) 
Log employment density^2           0.002 -0.006   
           (0.0038) (0.0080)   
Log dist. Km to capital city         0.008 0.022     
         (0.0366) (0.0691)     
Log dist. Km to capital city^2         -0.003 -0.009     
         (0.0064) (0.0117)     
Educ x Log emp density             0.001 0.001 
             (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Observations 645,758 1,174,248 644,583 1,169,978 644,144 1,169,338 640,255 1,165,021 643,312 1,166,400 644,144 1,169,338 645,269 1,173,463 
Municipalities 388 390 388 390 388 390 383 385 378 380 388 390 388 390 
R2 0.021 0.024 0.501 0.208 0.562 0.237 0.566 0.248 0.562 0.238 0.562 0.237 0.543 0.233 
Instruments exogeneity               
Hansen J statistic 4.910 1.445 3.610 1.345 1.717 0.996 6.140 5.677 2.596 0.299 6.590 8.606 1.706 0.820 
Chi-sq P-val 0.086 0.486 0.164 0.511 0.424 0.608 0.051 0.059 0.273 0.861 0.159 0.072 0.426 0.663 
Instruments relevance               
1. First-stage statistics               
 Shea partial R2                 
Log employment density 0.793 0.804 0.793 0.803 0.786 0.803 0.754 0.786 0.801 0.824 0.504 0.502 0.762 0.778 
Log employment density^2           0.508 0.497   
Educ x Log emp density             0.769 0.782 
2. Under-identification test               
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 15.12 14.83 15.53 14.91 16.174 14.99 13.47 12.98 14.87 13.88 12.18 12.47 16.30 15.15 
Chi-sq P-val 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.032 0.029 0.001 0.002 
3. Weak identification test               
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat 53.62 71.34 55.76 72.13 57.21 73.78 63.70 94.71 55.73 71.71 8.767 10.92 36.73 45.57 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.                                                                                                                                                                                                        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table replicates Table A2 in the Appendix using 1912, 1918 and 1928 populations as instrument for contemporaneous working population to calculate the log density variable in all columns. The square of these instruments are 
used in column 6. In columns 7 we use the average of population in 1912, 1918 and 1928 in the calculation of the product of education and log density variable. 
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Consider now the estimates of the impact of agglomeration on wages. We start by analyzing 
the results without distinguishing between the formal and informal sector, as reported in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. The specification without any other control in Column 1 shows 
an elasticity of wages with respect to density of 4.4%. When we add the control variables to 
this estimation (Columns 2 and 3), there is a reduction in elasticity to a value of 
approximately 3.7%. In Table A3 in the Appendix, the estimations are corrected for the 
endogeneity problem, and the results show that the elasticity when the control variables are 
added is approximately 2%. These values are lower than the 5% found by Duranton (2016) 
for the period from 1996 to 2012 using a similar database for Colombia. This difference may 
be due to potential measurement errors in the labor variables calculated by Duranton (2016) 
when the author compared the GEIH before and after 2007, the year in which there were 
several methodological changes, implying that the surveys could not be compared (DANE, 
2009).9     
 
When we estimate the model using the separate samples of formal and informal workers 
separately10, the results of the elasticity of wages with respect to density without any other 
control in Column 1 in Table 4 show that in the formal sector, the elasticity is -3.8% and is 
significant, and for the informal sector, the elasticity is 2.7% and is highly significant. When 
we add individual characteristics, occupation, and economic sector as control variables in 
Columns 3 and 4, we can observe that the elasticity of the formal sector is not statistically 
significantly different from zero, while the elasticity among informal workers shows a slight 
decrease to 2.2%, indicating that the productivity of informal workers in a city twice as dense 
is approximately 1.5% greater.11 This difference between formal and informal workers 
echoes the summary measure in Table 3 and Figure 2 and persists throughout the paper.   
 
So far, the results show that the density of city employment has a significantly positive effect 
on productivity in the informal sector but little effect in the formal sector. Comparing a small 
municipality with a density of 20 workers per km2 to Bogotá with a density of approximately 
2000 workers per km2, the agglomeration effect in the informal sector suggests that informal 
workers in denser cities will earn approximately 11% more than those in less dense cities. In 
the case of the formal sector, the non-significance of the city density elasticity of wages 
indicates the low level of cluster benefits in this sector. These results suggest that although 
there are important agglomeration economies in the informal sector, the benefits could be 
curtailed due to the negative effects of having a large informal sector in the economy. 
Informality may generate diseconomies of agglomeration that undermine the benefits 
associated with the urban scale in the economy in general and for those that can reach the 
formal sector in particular (Harris, 2014). As noted by Annez and Buckely (2009), 
informality may crowd out agglomeration benefits because the informal sector is an 
unproductive sector that consists of small-scale producers, and it increases the costs for the 
                                                          
9 One of the main methodological changes that affected the calculations of variables such as wages, 
employment, and labor participation was an increase in the size and structure of the sample, where the statistical 
representativeness for large cities changed to an increase from 13 to 23 cities in 2007.    
10 It is important to highlight that with the instruments, the number of municipalities analyzed is reduced from 
568 to 390. This means that the youngest municipalities and, therefore, the smaller cities are not considered in 
this part of the analysis. 
11 We followed the formula developed by Combes and Gobillon (2015): 2𝛽 − 1, where 𝛽 is the elasticity of 
productivity with respect to density. 
18 
 
formal sector through unfair competition (e.g., selling at very low prices that merely support 
subsistence). Also, a large informal sector may imply low institutional levels of the labor 
market because most jobs tend to be filled in an informal way through relatives, friends and 
social connections. This limits mobility across cities and discourages more productive 
workers from moving to better jobs, thus limiting urban scale effects on productivity. 
Additionally, a rationing of formal sector jobs in the economy may imply low incentives for 
workers to improve their skills locally, which limits the scope of agglomeration benefits 
(Duranton, 2015).12   
 
Regarding the other columns in Table 4, we can note that including geographic controls 
(Column 4), such as regional indicators, water availability, soil erosion, and altitude as well 
as a variable for market access (Column 5), measured as the distance in kilometers to the 
capital city of the department, yields no change to the coefficients on city density for the 
formal and informal sectors in Column 3.13 We can also observe that including geographic 
controls does not substantially increase the explanatory power of the regression; in fact, 
although these results are not reported, the coefficients on several geographic controls are 
not statistically significant. On the other hand, we found that wages are lower in the 
Caribbean region of Colombia than they are in the Central region in both the formal and 
informal sectors, while there are no wage differences between the rest of the regions and the 
Central region. 
 
We now turn to analyze possible heterogeneities in the agglomeration effects. Column 6 
attempts to detect non-linearities by adding the square of the logarithm of density as an 
independent variable to the specification of Column 3. The results show that the coefficients 
on the logarithm of density and the quadratic term are not statistically significantly different 
from zero for either the formal or informal sector, which suggests an absence of non-linearity 
in the agglomeration effects. This result is consistent with those found by Duranton (2016) 
for Colombia using data between 1996 and 2012. 
 
Finally, Column 7 adds the product of the worker’s number of years of education and the 
logarithm of density in order to determine whether there are differences in agglomeration 
benefits across skilled workers, that is, whether all workers benefit equally from the urban 
scale. The results show that the coefficients on the interaction term are not statistically 
significantly different from zero for either the formal or informal sector, which does not 
corroborate the hypothesis of higher returns to cities for more educated workers (Wheeler, 
2001; Rosenthal and Strange, 2008a; Bacolod et al., 2009; Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). On 
the one hand, these results could be due to the better amenities in larger cities, which lead 
higher educated workers to locate in these cities, therefore decreasing the returns to education 
there. On the other hand, there is a complementarity between city density and individual skills 
that is an important factor in explaining the over-representation of more highly skilled 
workers in large cities. In large cities, there are urban amenities that are used and enjoyed 
                                                          
12 García and Badillo (2017), using data from Colombia, confirm that formal job rationing does exist and that 
it affects approximately 62% of the workers who find themselves in the informal labor market. 
13 We also used time distance to the capital city of the department (calculated using Google Maps) as a measure 
of market access. The results are very similar to those using distance in kilometers. The results using the time 
distance variable are not presented here to save space but are available upon request. 
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more by more educated workers. Nevertheless, although this over-representation can occur 
in Colombia, the large cities in this country and in many large cities in developing countries 
have important urban disamenities, such as pollution, traffic congestion, crime, and excess 
garbage, to which more educated workers could be more sensitive, thus limiting the 
agglomeration benefits for this group. These results corroborate Duranton´s (2016) findings. 
 
8. Robustness Checks 
To assess the robustness of these results, Table 5 shows the results when we experiment with 
different city samples and types of workers, when we usw an alternative definition of 
informality, and when we employ different estimation techniques. Table 5 uses the same 
specification as Column 3 of Table 4. 
 
The presence of larger cities in the sample could affect the results because there may be 
measurement errors at the top end of the labor income distribution, meaning that it is possible 
that the highest wages are not measured in the formal sector in the largest cities, which could 
lead to an observation of lower wages in the formal sector in the densest cities. Column 1 in 
Table 5 shows the results of a regression that excludes observations corresponding to Bogotá, 
the capital of Colombia14, while Column 2 shows the results excluding observations from the 
five densest cities in Colombia, namely, Itagüí, Medellín, Barranquilla, Soledad, and Bogotá. 
Accordingly, the elasticities are slightly lower than when the capital city is included: for the 
informal sector, the elasticity is equal to 1.6%. When the densest cities are excluded, we 
observe that there are no significant changes in the elasticities. 
 
To evaluate the sensitivity of the results when we consider only the main cities in Colombia, 
Column 3 uses the information for only the 23 main municipalities and metropolitan areas. 
We grouped the municipalities into metropolitan areas to determine whether there are 
changes when the spatial unit of analysis is modified. It is important to highlight that for 
small areas, the municipality and the metropolitan area coincide, whereas large metropolitan 
areas are formed from several municipalities. The results show that the elasticities are lower 
than when all municipalities are considered and they are not grouped into metropolitan areas, 
but the difference is not sizable: the elasticity of wages with respect to density in the informal 
sector is 1.7%. When we consider the all of the municipalities and group them into 
metropolitan areas, the results in Column 4 are very similar to those when we do not group 
the municipalities into metropolitan areas. These findings suggest that even in the main 
municipalities of Colombia and working with a spatial unit closer to urban areas, the results 
showing greater agglomeration benefits in the informal sector than the formal sector remain. 
Interestingly, the R2 of the regression in Columns 3 and 4 is very similar to that in Column 3 
in Table 4. This is perhaps an indication that there are no differences when working with 
municipalities or metropolitan areas in the case of Colombia. This result is consistent with 
the results found by Duranton (2016) for Colombia, where using metropolitan areas instead 
of municipalities implies similar elasticities of wages with respect to city population. 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 According to Arango and Bonilla (2015) and García (2017), Bogotá accounts for approximately 17% of the 
country’s total population, 25% of its total employment, and 25% of its GDP. 
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Table 5. Agglomeration effects and informality, robustness check 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Excluding Bogotá  
Excluding the 
densest cities 
Only the 23 main 
municipalities and 
MA 
 
MA and  
municipalities 
 
 
Informality  
ILO 
 
Excluding low-
educated 
 self-employed 
informal workers 
 
Real hourly 
wages GMM LIML 
 Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Log employment density  -0.007 0.016** -0.009 0.023** -0.003 0.017* -0.003 0.019** 0.008 0.022** -0.004 0.029** -0.001 0.017** -0.006 0.021* -0.004 0.021** 
 (0.0068) (0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0116) (0.097) (0.0102) (0.0067) (0.0098) (0.0081) (0.0112) (0.0067) (0.0121) (0.0105) (0.0088) (0.0066) (0.0123) (0.0067) (0.0107) 
Observations  590,396 1,111,789 516,560 1,009,116 603,364 1,059,188 644,144 1,169,338 764,444 1,049,038 644,144 446,607 603,364 1,059,188 644,144 1,169,338 644,144 1,169,338 
Municipalities  387 389 383 385 40 40 374 376 390 390 388 388 40 40 388 390 388 390 
R2  0.567 0.236 0.572 0.241 0.562 0.239 0.562 0.237 0.519 0.196 0.562 0.402 0.557 0.239 0.562 0.237 0.562 0.237 
Instruments exogeneity                   
Hansen J statistic  0.792 1.516 0.091 1.995 3.130 0.485 1.770 1.293 0.272 0.848 1.717 1.439 4.115 1.247 1.717 0.996 1.717 0.996 
Chi-sq P-val  0.673 0.468 0.955 0.369 0.209 0.785 0.413 0.524 0.873 0.654 0.424 0.487 0.128 0.536 0.424 0.608 0.424 0.608 
Instruments relevance                    
1. First-stage statistics                    
 Shea partial R2                     
Log employment density  0.805 0.814 0.779 0.777 0.723 0.781 0.691 0.734 0.794 0.801 0.786 0.795 0.821 0.859 0.786 0.803 0.786 0.803 
2. Under-identification test                    
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  14.94 14.03 13.84 13.93 13.52 12.84 14.56 12.76 15.56 15.29 16.17 14.83 13.92 12.70 16.17 14.99 16.17 14.99 
Chi-sq P-val  0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
3. Weak identification test                    
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  59.09 83.11 71.06 82.13 49.93 65.76 47.71 72.54 58.66 74.69 57.20 62.84 54.69 74.30 57.21 73.78 57.21 73.78 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This table replicates column 3 of Table 4. Column 1 excludes observations corresponding to Bogotá and Column 2 excludes observations corresponding to the densest municipalities in terms of employment: Itagüí, Medellín, Barranquilla, Soledad and 
Bogotá. Column 3 aggregates municipalities into metropolitan areas (MA) and only uses information to 7 MA (Medellín-Valle de Abúrra, Cali-Yumbo, Barranquilla-Soledad, Bucaramanga-Girón-Piedecuesta-Floridablanca, Manizalez-Villa María, 
Pereira-Dos Quebradas-La Virginia, and Cúcuta-Villas del Rosario-Los Patios-El Zulia) and 16 municipalities, which represent the 23 main municipalities and MA in Colombia. Column 4 aggregates municipalities into MA (7) and uses the rest of 
municipalities. Column 5 uses the informality definition according to the International Labor Organization (ILO). Column 6 excludes low-educated (less than secondary education) self-employed informal workers. Column 7 reports the results using 
log real hourly wage as a dependent variable, adjusting hourly wages for price level using consumer price index (base year 2008) for each city as a deflator. 2SLS in Columns 1-7, GMM in Column 8, and LIML in Column 9. 
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We now test whether the results are sensitive to alternative definitions of informality. In 
the literature, at least two definitions are regularly used: the legalistic definition and the 
productivity definition. The former is the definition we follow in this paper, while the 
productive approach is based on the type of job and firm size. In Column 5, we use the 
productivity definition proposed by the International Labor Organization (ILO), which 
includes as informal workers all own-account workers (excluding administrative workers, 
professionals and technicians), unpaid family workers, and employers and employees 
working in establishments with fewer than five people. We observe that the results for 
the informal workers remain the same, with an elasticity of 2.2%, while in the formal 
sector, the elasticity is not statistically significantly different from zero. It is important to 
highlight that the productivity definition of informality underestimates the population 
compared to the legalistic definition because it does not include the possible presence of 
informal employment within large firms.15  Hence, it is possible to state that under either 
a narrower (productivity) or broader (legalistic) definition of informality, the positive 
agglomeration in the informal sector remains and is still higher than that in the formal 
sector.  
 
To consider the fact that there is a high proportion of workers in the informal sector who 
are self-employed16 and therefore their wages may not reflect the marginal productivity 
of labor, we re-estimated the model while excluding low-educated self-employed, 
informal workers.17 We verify the main results of the positive effect of agglomeration 
economies on wages in the informal sector and no effect in the formal sector. We note 
that the estimated elasticity of wages to employment density in the informal sector is 
higher than in Column 3 in Table 4. This result suggests that the higher agglomeration 
effects tend to be due to the nature of the occupation and the type of activity. By focusing 
on salaried informal workers, we also focus on more skilled workers, for whom the 
agglomeration effects should be stronger.  
 
As mentioned above, the relevant dependent variable in the models is the logarithm of 
the nominal hourly wage because it is more appropriate to measure differences in 
productivity across cities rather than measuring the variable in real terms, which is more 
related to differences in the standard of living among cities. However, to check our results 
against differences in regional price disparities, where we expect to find a higher price 
level in densely populated cities, and to make the results comparable to research that uses 
real wages (see, for instance, Wheeler (2006), Melo and Graham (2009), and Melo et al. 
(2017)), we re-estimated the models using the logarithm of the real hourly wage as the 
dependent variable. The results are shown in Column 7. Note that when using real wages, 
some cities are excluded from the sample because price data were unavailable; in fact, 
the consumer price index (base year 2008) that was used to deflate the wages is only 
available for the 23 main metropolitan areas, which leaves us with the sample in Column 
3. The estimated elasticity is 1.7%, which is similar to the elasticity found in Column 3 
using nominal wages and the same sample of cities.   
   
                                                          
15 We calculated the informality rate using the productivity definition and found that it is approximately six 
percentage points lower than the rate calculated based on the legalistic definition, which is consistent with 
the results of previous studies that compare different measures of informality in Colombia (see, Bernal, 
2009; Galvis, 2012; García, 2017).  
16 On average, 67% of informal workers are self-employed. 
17 Low-educated workers are those workers with less than a secondary school education, that is, we excluded 
professionals and technicians. Low-educated self-employed informal workers represent 59% of the total 
informal workers in our sample. 
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Finally, Columns 8 and 9 estimate the regression using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) and with Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) instead 
of 2SLS. The results show that the coefficients on employment density are again similar 
to those found in Table 4. 
 
In general, it appears that the instrumented coefficients on employment density by sector 
are generally statistically similar to our baseline 2SLS: they are not statistically 
significantly different from zero in the formal sector, and they are positive and significant 
in the informal sector. These results are robust to alternate samples of cities, type of 
employment, and estimation technique. 
 
9. Conclusions 
This paper sheds light on evidence regarding the relationship between agglomeration 
economies and productivity in a developing country, Colombia, which has a large 
informal sector. Among the main results, we have found that the density of local 
employment has a significantly positive effect on productivity in the informal sector, 
while there is little effect on the formal sector. The elasticity of wages with respect to 
employment density in the informal sector is approximately 2%, which in quantitative 
terms implies that moving from a city with a density of approximately 20 workers per 
km2 to Bogota—with an employment density of approximately 2000 workers per km2—
is associated with approximately 9% higher wages in the informal sector. This paper 
therefore provides empirical evidence that supports the idea that there are positive 
agglomeration returns in the informal sector and that such returns are higher than those 
achieved in the formal sector. 
 
The limited agglomeration returns in the formal sector may be due to the harmful effects 
of a large informal sector in the economy. On the one hand, low institutional levels in the 
labor market associated with a large informal sector limit labor mobility, which could 
discourage more productive workers and formal workers from moving to better jobs and 
restrict the effects of agglomeration economies. On the other hand, this sizable loss for 
formal workers due to urbanization may be due to the constraints in creation on formal 
jobs at the urban level, which may limit the incentives for workers to improve their skills 
locally and limit the scope of agglomeration benefits. Additionally, it is possible that 
workers in the informal sector may obtain higher benefits from the local market, and 
therefore, their incomes are more influenced by local housing and transportation costs, 
which could imply positive benefits associated with the urban scale. 
  
We also found evidence of limited agglomeration returns for highly educated workers. 
This result contrasts with the results from the extant literature for developed countries 
that highlight the existence of higher agglomeration returns for more educated people. 
One possible explanation for this result could be the existence of important disamenities 
in denser cities in developing countries that are not compensated by wages, particularly 
for more educated workers who are more sensitive to the negative amenities that make 
working unpleasant, and therefore affect the benefits of agglomeration. However, it is 
important to note that further studies are necessary to better understand this inference. 
 
This paper also contributes to the literature that argues that agglomeration economies 
encourage hard work (Rosenthal and Strange, 2008a), in this case, informal work. 
According to the literature on agglomeration, cities are productive places because they 
allow for labor pooling, the sharing of intermediate inputs, and knowledge spillover. 
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Informal workers also receive the benefits of these productive effects in the form of higher 
wages in denser cities. 
 
There are certain limitations that are worth recognizing in this research and that, at the 
same time, can serve to identify areas for future research. First, in this paper, we focus on 
static gains from agglomeration, but more recent research recognizes that agglomeration 
economies can be dynamic and present a permanent effect (Combes and Gobillon, 2015; 
De la Roca and Puga, 2017). This limitation is due to data constraints because in 
Colombia, longitudinal information at the worker level is not available, which would 
allow researchers to take into account the dynamics of workers. However, we could 
perhaps use information at the firm level, which may make it easier to generate a panel 
structure. In the case of Colombia, it is possible to use the Colombian Annual 
Manufacturing Survey, in which each establishment has a unique ID that would allow us 
to follow them over time. Second, we consider employment density as our measure of 
agglomeration economies, but it is possible that there are effects of the densities of formal 
and informal workers on the productivity of each sector. Including these densities 
distinguished by type of worker could be a way to understand how the quality of 
agglomeration economies affects their economic productivity. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Agglomeration effects, baseline model without informality (OLS) 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Only emp. 
density 
Individual 
characteristics 
Sector- 
Occupation 
Geographic 
 variables 
Market 
access 
Non-
lineal 
Education 
effects 1 
Education 
effects 2  
Log employment density  0.044*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.062 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0067) (0.0106) (0.0803) (0.0116) (0.0075) 
Log employment density^2       0.001   
      (0.0043)   
Log dist. Km to capital city      0.016   -0.026 
     (0.0524)   (0.0309) 
Log dist. Km to capital city^2      -0.005   -0.003 
     (0.0087)   (0.0048) 
Educ x Log emp density        -0.001 -0.001 
       (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Observations  1,920,678 1,914,957 1,913,815 1,901,513 1,905,428 1,913,815 1,919,330 1,907,001 
Municipalities  568 568 568 548 537 568 568 548 
R2  0.024 0.380 0.418 0.426 0.418 0.418 0.407 0.417 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.                                                            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models include year dummy variables. In Columns 2 to 6 individual characteristics included are: education indicators (primary, basic school, high school, technical 
or technological education, and university), gender, age and its squared, years in the current job and its squared. In Columns 3 to 8 all models include occupation (10) 
and economic sector (8) indicators. Geographical characteristics in Column 4 include five regional indicators (Central, Eastern, Western, Caribbean and Orinoco), a 
water availability index, a soil erosion index and the log of altitude and its square. Column 5 uses the distance in Km to the capital city of the department as a measure 
of market access. Column 7 and 8 include years of educations and the interaction between years of education and log employment density (Educ x Log emp density). 
Column 8 replicates Column 7 but adds geographical characteristics and the distance in Km to the capital city of the department as controls. 
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Table A2. Agglomeration effects, baseline model with informality (OLS) 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Only emp. density 
Individual 
characteristics 
Sector- 
Occupation 
Geographic 
variables 
Market  
access Non-lineal 
Education 
effects 
 Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Log employment density -0.037*** 0.044*** -0.003 0.039*** 0.004 0.038*** 0.008 0.038*** 0.006 0.035*** 0.092** 0.052 -0.001 0.026** 
 (0.009) (0.0101) (0.0071) (0.0109) (0.09593) (0.0107) (0.0049) (0.0071) (0.0061) (0.0119) (0.0375) (0.0926) (0.0069) (0.0102) 
Log employment density^2           0.0051** 0.001   
           (0.0020) (0.0049)   
Log dist Km to capital city         -0.026 -0.002     
         (0.0309) (0.0566)     
Log dist Km to capital city^2         0.004 -0.002     
         (0.0054) (0.0093)     
Educ x Log emp density             0.001 0.001* 
             (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Observations 673,939 1,246,739 672,709 1,242,248 672,247 1,241568 667,387 1,234,126 670,577 1,234,851 672,247 1,241,568 673,426 1,245,904 
Municipalities 564 568 564 568 564 568 544 548 533 537 564 568 564 568 
R2 0.022 0.025 0.501 0.207 0.562 0.236 0.564 0.247 0.562 0.237 0.562 0.236 0.542 0.232 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.                                                                                                                                                          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models include year dummy variables. In columns 2 to 6 individual characteristics included are: education indicators (primary, basic school, high school, technical or technological education, and university), gender, age and its 
squared, years in the current job and its squared. In columns 3 to 7 all models include occupation (10) and economic sector (8) indicators. Geographical characteristics in column 4 include five regional indicators (Central, Eastern, 
Western, Caribbean and Orinoco), a water availability index, a soil erosion index and the log of altitude and its square. Column 5 uses the distance in Km to the capital city of the department as a measure of market access. Column 7 
includes years of educations and the interaction between years of education and log employment density (Educ x Log emp density). 
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Table A3. Agglomeration effects, baseline model without informality (2SLS) 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Only emp. 
density 
Individual 
characteristics 
Sector- 
Occupation 
Geographic 
 variables 
Market 
access 
Non-
lineal 
Education 
effects 1 
Education 
effects 2  
Log employment density  0.029** 0.021* 0.022* 0.016* 0.012 -0.069 0.020 0.019 
 (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0079) (0.0090) (0.1407) (0.0154) (0.0115) 
Log employment density^2       -0.006   
      (0.0079)   
Log dist. Km to capital city          
         
Log dist. Km to capital city^2          
         
Educ x Log emp density        0.001 -0.001 
       (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Observations  1,820,006 1,814,561 1,813,482 1,813,482 1,813,482 1,813,482 1,818,732 1,818,732 
Municipalities  390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 
R2  0.022 0.381 0.419 0.425 0.424 0.419 0.408 0.416 
Instruments exogeneity         
Hansen J statistic  0.064 0.291 0.328 3.413 3.400 7.334 0.223 2.708 
Chi-sq P-val  0.968 0.864 0.849 0.182 0.183 0.119 0.895 0.258 
Instruments relevance          
1. First-stage statistics          
 Shea partial R2           
Log employment density  0.801 0.801 0.798 0.774 0.811 0.498 0.777 0.781 
Log employment density^2      0.497   
Educ x Log emp density       0.780 0.781 
2. Under-identification test          
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  15.00 15.03 15.28 9.46 14.07 12.46 15.32 15.67 
Chi-sq P-val  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.003 0.029 0.002 0.001 
3. Weak identification test          
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  13.91 64.68 66.05 75.84 62.00 9.57 42.34 36.29 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.                                                                                            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models include year dummy variables. In Columns 2 to 6 individual characteristics included are: education indicators (primary, basic school, high school, technical 
or technological education, and university), gender, age and its squared, years in the current job and its squared. In Columns 3 to 8 all models include occupation (10) 
and economic sector (8) indicators. Geographical characteristics in Column 4 include five regional indicators (Central, Eastern, Western, Caribbean and Orinoco), a 
water availability index, a soil erosion index and the log of altitude and its square. Column 5 uses the distance in Km to the capital city of the department as a measure 
of market access. Column 7 and 8 include years of educations and the interaction between years of education and log employment density (Educ x Log emp density). 
Column 8 replicates Column 7 but adds geographical characteristics and the distance in Km to the capital city of the department as controls. 
 
 
 
 
 
